EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
This has been a relatively quiet period in the Court of Justice as concerns social security case law. There has been only one important 1408 case (Habelt discussed in more detail below) in which the Court reflects further on its case law on citizenship (albeit almost without mentioning the concept). The Court also decided the Klöppel case in which it ruled that Regulation 1408/71 required a Member State to take into account, for the purposes of family benefits, the period during which a comparable benefit was received in another Member State as though that period had been completed in its own territory. The Court might have, but did not, refer to this as an example of the principle of assimilation of facts now enshrined in the The Court of First Instance considered an important issue in relation to the provision of private health insurance benefits which, in a number of Member States, play a significant role in the provision of national health care
(BUPA v Commission discussed below).
Territoriality and citizenship
The Habelt case reflects the development of the concept of EU citizenship. 2 In short, 3 the case concerned the compatibility of restrictions to the principle of exportability of benefits The facts of the three joined cases are somewhat lengthy and will not be discussed in detail here.
the movement of persons within the Union and their integration into the society of other States (para 82). The Court therefore found that the relevant provisions were incompatible with the freedom of movement of persons and, in particular, Article 42. 6 The outcome of this case may be welcomed but the Court's approach may be subject to some criticism. First, although the Court's case law on free movement is clearly driven by the citizenship provisions, the Court continues to rely on specific provisions (Article 39 and 43
EC in this case) as the expression of the general principle of freedom of movement set out in Article 3EC. 7 In general this approach may not create any difficulties, but in this particular case it simply serves to obscure the reasoning behind the Court's approach. The Court relies ostensibly on Articles 39 and 42EC to justify its approach. But both refer only to free movement of workers and it is difficult to see why freedom of movement for workers (as opposed to citizens) should be affected by a provision which (in two of the cases here)
impacted on a decision to move to a third country (neither the place of birth, nor Germany)
after attaining pension age. Second, the Court confounds two entirely different issues when it repeats its standard distinction between full exportability of social security and nonexportability of special non-contributory benefits, on the basis that the latter are closely linked to the social environment, and then makes this the basis for rejecting the German government's rationale of wishing to integrate the persons concerned into its social environment. Assuming that the linkage of a benefit to its social environment justifies its nonexportation, this principle still says nothing about whether the desire to integrate ethnic Germans into a German social environment is or is not justified. 8 The correct basis for the decision is surely that set out by Advocate General Trstenjak who questioned whether the 'integration idea' which, according to the German government, provided the basis for the German provisions, was compatible with the concept of Union citizenship set out in Articles 17 and 18 EC. He went on to argue that 6 . One of the joined cases also concerned the compatibility of an annex provision concerning a GermanAustrian bilateral convention which the Court also declared incompatible with the Treaty in that it restricted export of benefits. While coming to the same conclusion as the Court, the Advocate General arguably arrived there by a much clearer and more legally-sound route.
Private health insurance, competition and risk equalisation
In an interesting case, extensive framework for the operation of the health insurance market was established in the Irish Health Insurance Act 1994, which opened up the market to other providers subject to certain principles.
One of the main principles on which the operation of the Irish system is based is 'community rating'. 'Community rating' means that an insurance company must charge the same rate for a given level of service, regardless of age, sex or health status. 10 However, despite the principle of community rating, it would be possible for an insurer by targeting a younger and/or healthier sector of the market to ensure that it had lower costs and could charge lower premiums. This could result in 'cherry picking' with one or more insurers being left with the older and less healthy members and running into financial difficulties. The legislation therefore also contains provisions concerning 'risk equalisation'. Risk equalisation is a process that aims to neutralise differences in insurers' costs that arise due to variations in the health status of their members by requiring insurers with a lower risk profile to pay a risk equalisation payment to a company with a higher risk profile. In practice this was always going to involve a subsidy to the existing, long established VHI (with, almost by definition, a large proportion of older people in its client base) from BUPA, the main new entrant to the market.
Although the risk equalisation scheme was not actually brought into effect until 2006, the EC Commission was notified by the Irish authorities of their intention to introduce such a scheme and, having reviewed the scheme did not object. Undertakings entrusted with the operation of services of general economic interest … shall be subject to the rules contained in the Treaty, in particular to the rules on competition, in so far as the application of such rules does not obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.
Article 87(1) EC provides:
Save as otherwise provided in this Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the common market.
BUPA argued that the decision of the Court of Justice in the Altmark case 13 -given after the Commission decision -and, in particular the criteria laid down in that judgment in order to establish the existence of a SGEI mission, required annulment of the Commission decision.
However, the Court of First Instance, in a lengthy judgment, rejected each of the arguments advanced by BUPA and dismissed the application to annul the Commission's decision.
BUPA had, in particular, argued that the concept of a SGEI mission was one of Community law which was strict in nature, and compliance with it was subject to unlimited control by 
Maintenance obligations and non-discrimination
In Hansen, the applicant was a father of a daughter who lived with her mother who had sole parental authority. He was not married to the mother. German civil law sets out maintenance obligations in respect of non-custodial parents of children and outlines how maintenance is to 14.
As the detailed arguments are mainly of interest from a competition law perspective they will not be discussed here. 15.
It should be noted that, before this judgment was given, BUPA had in part fulfilled its own prophecies about the disastrous effect the RES would have on competition by withdrawing from the Irish market. On the other hand, the impact may be somewhat less disastrous given that BUPA's Irish business was taken over by another insurance company. 16.
Readers should note that there have been a number of recent ECHR decisions concerning the pension entitlements of citizens of the former GDR, in which the decision of Klose v Germany, 12923/03, 25 September 2007 has been cited as a precedent. However, at the time of writing this case is still not available on the Court's website.
be calculated according to a range of circumstances including the age of the child and the financial circumstances of the non-custodial parent. Separately, the federal Child Benefits
Act provides for payment of child benefit to the custodial parent (where the child lives with one parent only). However, in order to ensure that the non-custodial parent also benefits, he or she is allowed to deduct half of the child benefit paid from the amount of maintenance which he or she is liable to contribute. This does not, however, apply where the amount of maintenance payable falls below a set minimum calculated to cover the costs of a child's basic needs. Because the amount of maintenance due fell below that set minimum, Mr.
Hansen was not allowed to deduct half the child benefit received from his maintenance obligations.
Mr. Hansen complained under Article 14 in conjunction with Article 8 of the Convention that this constituted discrimination against him in relation to the mother of his child, who was able to use the whole amount of child benefits whereas he had had to use his part of the child benefits for the maintenance payments. He also submitted that it constituted discrimination against him in relation to non-custodial parents with higher incomes.
The German Federal Constitutional Court had already ruled that the maintenance provisions were compatible with the provisions of the German Basic Law (in unrelated proceedings).
17
The Constitutional Court held that, first, there was no violation of the principle of equality assuming that the provision did involve unequal treatment, the Constitutional Court held that this would be justified by the legitimate aim of securing the subsistence level of children of separated parents. In view of the parents' duty to provide for the maintenance of their children, and given that non-custodial parents were protected by minimum amounts of selfretention from falling below the level of subsistence on account of their maintenance obligations, there was no violation of the principle of equality.
Second, the Court accepted that the provisions entailed different treatment between custodial and non-custodial parents. However, the unequal treatment was justified because the rules aimed to adjust the double burden lone parents are faced with when caring for their children and working to cover the financial needs of the family. Thus, the Court took the view that the provisions assisted custodial parents to cover their own living costs and to ameliorate the child's living conditions, which are determined by the financial situation of the custodial parent. The non-custodial parents' income was sufficiently protected by minimum amounts set in the legislation for retained income.
The Court of Human Rights, following its Petrovic judgment, did not have any difficulty in deciding that the issue fell within the scope of Article 8. 18 On the substantive issue, the Court of Human Rights (as it has done in several previous cases) followed closely the approach of the Constitutional Court. Turning first regarding the issue of discrimination between parents, given that it found that both parents are equally responsible for the maintenance of their children, the Court took the view that the maintenance rules did entail a different treatment of persons placed in an analogous situation (in that non-custodial parents were treated differently to custodial parents). However, following the reasoning of the German Constitutional Court as to (i) the aim of supporting the burdens faced by lone parents and (ii) the safeguards built in for the income of non-custodial parents, the Court of Human Rights held that the provisions pursued a legitimate aim and were proportionate. Regarding the argument that the provisions acted to the disadvantage of non-custodial parents on low incomes, this would appear to be the inevitable outcome of the system as described (although no statistics are presented in the decision). However, as is its wont, the Court did not find it 18 . Petrovic v Austria 20458/92, 27 March 1998, Reports of Judgements and Decisions 1998-II, (1998) 33 EHRR 307. It would appear that the issue would also fall within the scope of P1-1 as it related to the right to child benefit but the Court, presumably because the issue had not been raised by the applicant, did not advert to this.
necessary to address the issue of whether there was a difference in treatment as, even assuming there was, it found, again following the reasoning of the German Constitutional
Court, that the provisions pursued a legitimate aim (securing a minimum income for the children of separated parents) and were proportionate (given that the law set a minimum retained income for the non-custodial parent).
This decision again highlights the limited degree of success which applicants have in bringing social security claims before the Court of Human Rights and the extent to which the Court (arguably correctly) defers to the decisions of national courts (in this case, the German Constitutional Court) which are best placed to make an informed assessment of their national rules. While some might argue that such decisions (which do not display a very rigorous analysis of the national provisions) justify national courts in applying a similarly relaxed level of review, it is -on the contrary -arguable that the approach adopted by the Court of Human Rights requires a more rigorous approach at a national level, thereby ensuring that responsibility for the implementation of the Convention is appropriately allocated amongst the different judicial levels.
The Jonkman case -righting former wrongs
The Jonkman judgment involves the compatibility of measures taken by the Belgian authorities to rectify earlier discrimination in relation to statutory pensions with Directive 79/7/EEC on equal treatment for men and women in matters of social security. 12.
Court of
In the case of Ms Permesaen, the Nivelles Labour Court, by a judgment of 26
December 2003, upheld the NPO's arguments in part. It found that making the grant of a pension identical to that of male workers subject to payment of the contributions which would have had to have been paid had the worker been affiliated to that scheme during her professional career was not discriminatory. By contrast, it did consider interest at an annual rate of 10% to be discriminatory.
13.
The NPO appealed against the judgments of 17 November 1997 and 9 January 1998 to the Cour du travail de Bruxelles (Brussels Higher Labour Court). Ms Permesaen appealed to that same court against the judgment of 26 December 2003.
14. The Brussels Labour Court takes the view that the way in which the adjustment system introduced by the Royal Decree of 25 June 1997 is to be applied may be discriminatory. It notes in that regard that the single payment of a very large capital sum represents, for a pensioner, a considerable obstacle. It also draws attention to the tax aspect of that adjustment system, namely that at the material time the adjustments were deductible for tax purposes with regard to the stewards, which is not the case for the air hostesses. It observes lastly that the rate of interest applied is higher than the statutory rate for damages and default interest, and higher than the banking rate. 
The Brussels Labour Court takes the view that the resolution of the disputes in

On the questions referred for a preliminary ruling
Preliminary considerations
16.
It should first of all be noted that the parties to the main proceedings do not dispute that the initial exclusion of the air hostesses from the special scheme for civil aviation air crew was discriminatory.
17. Moreover, it should be noted that Article 141(1) and (2) 
23.
Where such discrimination has been suffered, equal treatment is to be achieved by placing the worker discriminated against in the same situation as that of workers of the other sex. Consequently, the worker cannot claim more favourable treatment, particularly in financial terms, than he would have had if he had been duly accepted as a member (see Fisscher, paragraphs 35 and 36, and Preston and Others, paragraph 38).
24.
Clearly that case-law is applicable by analogy to membership of a statutory pension scheme. It follows that a Member State, when it adopts rules intended to allow a persons of a particular sex, originally discriminated against, to become eligible for the pension scheme applicable to persons of the opposite sex, can choose to restore equal treatment by requiring the payment of a sum representing the difference between the contributions paid by the persons originally discriminated against during the period in which the discrimination took place and the higher contributions paid by the other category of persons during the same period. The fact that the latter category of persons benefit in the meantime from limitation of an action for payment of contributions cannot prevent adjustment as described above, on the condition however, as the Advocate General pointed out in point 70 of her Opinion, that a similar limitation period is set with regard to the new members.
25.
In addition, in order to prevent any reverse discrimination, the adjustment contributions can be increased by interest intended to compensate for inflation. As the Advocate General observed in point 38 of her Opinion, and subject to the condition in point 39 thereof, such an increase ensures that the contributions paid by the new members are not in real terms lower than those paid by the workers who have been members since the pension scheme was established.
26.
For the reasons set out by the Advocate General in points 64 and 65 of her Opinion, the foregoing considerations are limited to the case where the adjustment of pension rights is effective from the date on which the worker is entitled to retire. Adjustment offered to persons who have already retired, and which requires the payment of a sum representing the difference between the contributions paid by those persons in the period during which they were discriminated against and the higher contributions paid by the other category of persons during the same period, does not end the discriminatory treatment unless it results in the same calculation of pension rights throughout the retirement of each of the interested parties. 
30.
It is furthermore apparent from the Royal Decree of 25 June 1997 that that decree makes provision, in exceptional circumstances which are not applicable in this instance, for spreading the payments of adjustment contributions, in the form of the payment of annual instalments.
31.
In the light of the facts set out above, it must be held that the obligation imposed on the interested parties to make the adjustment payments in a single payment has made the adjustment of the air hostesses' pension rights excessively difficult.
32.
As regards interest at an annual rate of 10%, the parties to the main proceedings, the Commission and the Italian government have all stated or admitted that that rate is exceptionally high. When questioned on that subject at the hearing, the NPO was not able to explain why the Royal Decree of 25 June 1997 had set an interest rate exceeding the rate of inflation.
33.
In any event, it is common ground that the effect of setting an interest rate which exceeds that necessary to compensate for inflation is that the contributions paid by the new members are in real terms higher than those paid by the workers which have been members since the pension scheme was established. Therefore, far from putting the air hostesses in the same position as the stewards, that interest rate has allowed the unequal treatment of the air hostesses to continue.
34.
It is, however, for the referring court, which is the only court to have full knowledge of national law, to ascertain what percentage of the annual interest rate of 10% laid down by the Royal Decree of 25 June 1997 could be intended to compensate for inflation.
35.
It follows from all the foregoing considerations that Directive 79/7 precludes a Member State, when it adopts rules intended to allow persons of a particular sex, originally discriminated against, to become eligible for the pension scheme applicable to persons of the other sex, from requiring the payment of adjustment contributions to be made together with interest other than that to compensate for inflation. That directive also precludes a requirement that that payment be made as a single sum, where that condition makes the adjustment concerned impossible or excessively difficult in practice. That is the case in particular where the sum to be paid exceeds the annual pension of the interested party. While they retain the choice of the measures to be taken, those authorities must in particular ensure that national law is changed so as to comply with Community law as soon as possible and that the rights which individuals derive from Community law are given full effect.
The obligations on a Member
39.
In addition, as the Court has repeatedly held in situations of discrimination contrary to Community law, for as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted, observance of the principle of equality can be ensured only by granting to persons within the disadvantaged category the same advantages as those enjoyed by persons within the favoured category. In such a situation, a national court must set aside any discriminatory provision of national law, without having to request or await its prior removal by the legislature, and apply to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by the persons in the other category (Case 
41.
In the light of the foregoing, the answer to the second part of the questions referred is that, following a judgment given by the Court on an order for reference from which it is apparent that the national legislation is incompatible with Community law, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to take the general or particular measures necessary to ensure that Community law is complied with, by ensuring in particular that national law is changed so as to comply with Community law as soon as possible and that the rights which individuals derive from Community law are given full effect. Where discrimination infringing Community law has been found, for as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted, the national court must set aside any discriminatory provision of national law, without having to request or await its prior removal by the legislature, and apply to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by the persons in the other category.
Costs
…
On those grounds, the Court (First Chamber) hereby rules: 
2.
Following a judgment given by the Court on an order for reference from which it is apparent that the national legislation is incompatible with Community law, it is for the authorities of the Member State concerned to take the general or particular measures necessary to ensure that Community law is complied with, by ensuring in particular that national law is changed so as to comply with Community law as soon as possible and that the rights which individuals derive from Community law are given full effect.
3.
Where discrimination infringing Community law has been found, for as long as measures reinstating equal treatment have not been adopted, the national court must set aside any discriminatory provision of national law, without having to request or await its prior removal by the legislature, and apply to members of the disadvantaged group the same arrangements as those enjoyed by the persons in the other category.
Notes
1. This is an interesting case which concerns the measures which must be taken by a Member State to rectify former discrimination under Directive 79/7/EEC. The issue dates back to the early Defrenne decisions involving the pension rights of Sabena air hostesses. At that time, male cabin crew had access to a different pension scheme and basically paid higher contributions in order to obtain higher benefits. Under the then legislation female hostesses were required to retire at 40 and, therefore, the higher pension scheme was not applied to them. This was clearly discriminatory on grounds of sex. Subsequently, from 1981, the male pension scheme was made available to women. In respect of the period prior to 1981, Belgian law required payment of retrospective contributions and a special 'adjustment procedure' was introduced in 1997. It was the existence and details of this scheme which were questioned in the questions referred to the Court of Justice.
2. First, the Court clarified that persons who are entitled to join a pension scheme (from which they were formerly excluded on discriminatory grounds) must pay the relevant contributions (para 22-3 of the judgment). 19 As Advocate General Kokott pointed out, such persons could not ask to be treated in a more favourable manner than if the scheme had been open to them from its inception (at para 33 of her opinion). 20 In many cases of discrimination, this may not give rise to any difficulties (such as where contributions were the same for men and women but benefits differed). However, it would have implications if, for example, the Court of Justice were to hold that the (direct or indirect) exclusion of women from insurance under national law was in breach of Directive 79/7. 
4.
However, although a Member State is allowed to require payment of retrospective contributions (adjusted for inflation), it must still do so in a manner which does not deprive the remedy of its effectiveness and may not require payment in a manner which is 'impossible or extremely difficult in practice' (para 28 of the judgment).
Clearly the Belgian requirement that the contributions be paid in a lump sum involving a multiple of the pensioner's income was not compatible with the Directive. 5. This issue was addressed by Advocate General Kokott. She suggested that the claimants should be allowed to make monthly payments (para 52 of the opinion et seq.). She also suggested a number of (possibly inconsistent) principles for the calculation of the monthly amount. First, the retrospective contributions should be paid in full over the period during which the pension would be paid; and second, however, the amount of the monthly contributions should not be so high as to deny any material benefit to the claimants. 22 Kokott went on to suggest that it would be 'reasonable' to allow the claimants to retain about half of the resulting increase in their pension. Limited financial details are provided in the case materials. However, it is not necessarily clear that the objective of paying off the full contributions and providing some financial benefit to the claimants are mutually consistent.
Recognising this (at para 56), Advocate General Kokott pointed out that the Member
States concerned (whose legislation had caused the discrimination) and the social security institutions must bear any financial burdens involved in the effective enforcement of equal treatment (para 57). The Court did not comment on this aspect of the case.
6. This is, however, an important issue. It is important to recall that statutory pension schemes are rarely calculated on anything approaching actuarial principles and, therefore, the analogy with private and occupational schemes should not be pursued too far. While, in principle, it may be reasonable to require those discriminated against to pay retrospective contributions, it may also be important to emphasise the effective implementation of the principle of equal treatment (i.e. putting persons discriminated against insofar as possible in the situation they would have been in had in not been for the discrimination) rather than formal equality (i.e. concern about whether such persons are paying exactly the equivalent amount a man would have paid at the time). It may be necessary for the Court to adopt some practical approaches (such as those suggested by the Advocate General) to ensure that the principle of equal treatment is implemented and to place any additional financial burden on the authors of the discrimination (in reality of course in many cases on current and future social insurance contributors).
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